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Abstract: This interdisciplinary paper tries to identify specific small state characteristics with 
respect to the emergence, function and application of legal norms. Three respective 
assumptions are derived from theoretical considerations. An exploratory single-case study 
shows that all assumptions apply to Liechtenstein. The principality can be described as a hybrid 
legal system that is significantly shaped by foreign legal norms. Liechtenstein’s dualistic 
constitution particularly combines a powerful monarch with extensive direct democratic 
elements. The microstate’s legal system depends on supports from sources beyond its territory 
and citizenry, such as law schools, legal experts and academic sources. Several brief 
comparisons and examples regarding Andorra, Monaco and San Marino supplement the socio-
legal study. Finally, the authors suggest to apply the assumptions to a wide range of 
jurisdictions in order to learn more about their explanatory power. 
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Introduction 
 
Law is a key instrument of public governance in modern states. Small jurisdictions are 
no exception (Butler & Morris, 2017, p. vi). But are there any specific small state characteristics 
when it comes to the emergence, function and application of legal norms? This research 
question calls for an interdisciplinary and theory-driven research design (Wolf, 2016a, pp. 4-
7). Therefore, in this exploratory study we try to combine approaches from both legal studies 
and social science. 
 
In the following section, three assumptions regarding fundamental aspects of law in 
small states, as derived from theoretical considerations, are proposed. Thereafter, we address 
several methodological issues concerning our legal small state analysis. The empirical sections 
of our contribution are mainly based on a qualitative single case study. This means that the 
assumptions are preliminary examined with regard to the legal system of the Principality of 
Liechtenstein, a ‘most likely’ case. Several brief comparisons and examples regarding Andorra, 
Monaco and San Marino supplement our socio-legal study. Finally, we discuss, inter alia, to 
what extent our findings can be generalised and may contribute to “mainstreaming the study of 
small states” (Baldacchino, 2018). 
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Law and legal studies meet small state theory 
 
Contemporary small jurisdictions are quite heterogeneous (the first two paragraphs of 
this section are mainly based on Wolf, 2016b, p. 85). Small island states in the Caribbean or 
the Pacific, for example, differ a lot from European microstates with regard to legal, political 
and social aspects (Veenendaal, 2013; Wettenhall, 2018). But even the European microstates 
show considerable legal differences (Blevin, 2016, pp. 511-512). Against this background, 
Geser (1992, p. 632) has argued that small state theory has to operate on a rather high level of 
abstraction. Moreover, researchers have to take into account that the original impulses of a 
small state size can be modified – e.g. intensified, weakened, neutralised, reversed or diverted 
– by other country-specific factors (Fanger & Illy, 1981, p. 236). This means that certain 
cultural, economic, political and social characteristics more or less tend to distort or transform 
genuine effects of smallness on a legal system. Such additional intervening factors, as well as 
their direction and intensity, may not be well known to the legal scholar or social scientist 
conducting a respective small state study. Thus, given the empirical heterogeneity of small 
jurisdictions as well as the vagueness and the interdependency of the small state concept, the 
usefulness of the small state approach in scientific research has been called into question. For 
example, Baehr (1975, p. 466) was convinced of the “insufficiency of the concept as an 
analytical tool. Whatever criterion is adopted, small states form too broad a category for 
purposes of analysis”. 
 
This opinion does not appear to have become the majority view in the scientific 
community. The small state has “proven to be a useful tool for analysis” (Baldacchino, 2018, 
p. 7). Despite the above-mentioned conceptual or methodological pitfalls of theory-oriented 
small state studies (and other potential problems), carefully designed and conducted small state 
research should be able to make at least modest “descriptive or explanatory inferences … that 
go beyond the particular observations collected” (King, Keohane & Verba, 1994, pp. 7-8). The 
goal is to “identify a common small state behaviour in relation to certain … issue-areas” 
(Christmas-Møller, 1983, p. 46) such as key features of small legal systems. When it comes to 
the detailed and theory-driven analysis of small jurisdictions, however, “scholarship, 
particularly legal scholarship, is relatively scarce” (Butler & Morris, 2017, p. vi). Against this 
backdrop, the aim of our exploratory study is twofold: first, we aspire to deduce a couple of 
key assumptions regarding law in small states; second, we intend to preliminary examine these 
assumptions with regard to a selected microstate. We do not claim to deduce and study all 
possible presumptions concerning small legal systems. 
 
Many studies suggest that small jurisdictions are likely to incorporate foreign law to a 
large extent (e.g. Frommelt, 2016; Gantner & Eibl, 1999; Geser, 1992; Wolf, 2016a). Being a 
“policy-taker” (Veenendaal & Wolf, 2016, p. 280) constraints a small state’s autonomy and 
democracy (Donlan, Marrani, Twomey & Zammit, 2017, p. 192) since the small jurisdiction is 
dependent on external legal and political decisions, at least to a certain degree. However, such 
a political strategy implies several advantages for a country with limited resources: The 
adoption of foreign legal provisions is time-saving and cost-reducing (Gantner & Eibl, 1999, 
p. 83; Kramer, 2017, p. 5). It facilitates employing lawyers and legal experts from other 
jurisdictions, if necessary. Moreover, when faced with a small internal market (Kocher, 2002, 
p. 18), it eases export-oriented economic transactions (Geser, 1992, p. 638). Therefore, our first 
assumption reads as follows: A small jurisdiction extensively adopts foreign legal norms. 
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Several scholars note that many small countries tend to develop and preserve rather 
unusual political and legal institutions. Compared to medium-size and large jurisdictions, their 
constitutional arrangements can often be described as deviant (Veenendaal & Wolf, 2016, p. 
279). It appears that small political systems do benefit from such constitutional systems: their 
citizens are permanently confronted with foreign cultural and social communications, products 
and norms. Against this background, it can be an important national objective to preserve 
traditional identity-establishing and community-building institutions (Blevin, 2016, p. 290; 
Gantner & Eibl, 1999, p. 33; Geser, 1992, p. 635; Veenendaal, 2015, p. 347). These 
considerations do not contradict the above-mentioned first assumption which concerns 
imported legal provisions and policies below constitutional law. Thus, our second assumption 
states: A small jurisdiction features remarkable or unusual constitutional characteristics. 
 
For a small state, it may be demanding to establish and maintain all the necessary 
facilities and institutions of a modern legal system, in financial, organisational and human 
resource terms: these include legal education and training as well as a sufficient number of 
legal experts in the private sector and the civil service, especially in public administration and 
the courts. As Butler and Morris (2017, p. v) put it, small countries “face challenges in 
providing a complete legal and judicial infrastructure”. They may be forced to draw on foreign 
or international sources in order to run their legal systems. This leads us to our third 
assumption: A small jurisdiction is dependent on external resources to maintain its judicial 
and legal institutions. 
 
An augmented single case study and its rationale 
 
In the last section, we tried to comply with the scientific guidelines set by King et al. 
(1994, pp. 100-114) in order to construct falsifiable and internally consistent theoretical 
assumptions which draw a balance between concreteness and generalisation. For the purposes 
of our empirical study, the smallness of a jurisdiction is the independent or explanatory factor 
whereas the legal phenomena specified in the respective assumptions are the dependent 
characteristics (cf. Amstrup, 1976, p. 165). Apparently, it would be desirable to examine our 
assumptions with regard to a vast number of both large and small countries. This could enable 
us to “design a study that selects on the basis of the explanatory variables suggested by our 
theory and let the dependent variable[s] vary” (King et al., 1994, p. 149). However, our current 
research resources are too limited to run a rigorous large-n study. We guess that a rather 
anecdotal or even superficial “journey through small state governance” (Wettenhall, 2018) is 
no reasonable or reliable alternative. On the other hand, we possess rare expert knowledge 
about the legal system of the Principality of Liechtenstein. Against this backdrop, we opt for 
an exploratory study based on an in-depth analysis of a single case (cf. Veenendaal, 2015, p. 
347; Wolf, 2016b, p. 93), keeping in mind its specific pros and cons. 
 
Liechtenstein is a microstate (Geser, 1992, p. 631) with obvious small state 
characteristics: a resident population of just under 38,000 inhabitants; and a geographical land 
mass of 160 km2. At least for the purposes of our preliminary study, selecting a very small state 
like Liechtenstein relieves us from another lengthy and inconclusive discussion of small state 
definitions. This does not mean that we “ignore or avoid the issue” (Baldacchino, 2018, p. 7), 
however. As a clear micro-jurisdiction, Liechtenstein can be described as a “most likely” case 
in the framework of our research design. With regard to our guiding research question and our 
theoretical assumptions, selecting the Alpine principality for a case study is of particular 
interest because it enables us to conduct an in-depth analysis. Liechtenstein undoubtedly is a 
‘most likely’ case as to the key dimensions of resident population and geographical land mass, 
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but it has some peculiarities which may impact on our research results. In contrast to several 
other small states, the microstate has no colonial past, is not an island, is rather wealthy and 
situated in a peaceful and democratic regional environment. It is rather difficult to estimate 
how these factors may impact on our findings. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to assume in 
accordance with small state theory – as outlined above – that the exceptional smallness of the 
selected jurisdiction is a strong and dominant explanatory factor. 
 
In order to raise the generalisability of our exploratory single case study at least a little, 
we add brief comparisons and examples regarding in particular Andorra, Monaco and San 
Marino. These very small states have several characteristics in common with Liechtenstein 
(Marxer & Pállinger, 2009, p. 901). Such an approach helps us to exclude the possibility that 
Liechtenstein is an outlier or deviant case that is not at all suited for generalisation. 
Nevertheless, our study is exploratory, i.e. if our theoretical assumptions are confirmed, we 
admittedly do not learn that much about their explanatory power: they would have simply 
passed a “plausibility probe” (cf. Welzel, 2016, p. 412). However, if our presumptions are 
falsified, we may conclude that their general explanatory power is likely to be poor (cf. King 
et al., 1994, p. 209). As to data and methodological approaches, we mainly conduct a legal 
study supplemented by some socio-legal examples and references to social science literature 
where appropriate. The following three sections are arranged according to our three 
assumptions. 
 
Liechtenstein as a policy-taker and hybrid legal system 
 
The Principality of Liechtenstein is situated between Austria and Switzerland and close 
to Germany. In accordance with a traditional but sometimes criticized point of view (Glenn, 
2006, p. 434), the Alpine microstate forms part of the Germanic legal family. This means that 
Liechtenstein is mainly shaped by the civil law tradition. As Mousourakis (2015, p. 302) notes, 
in civil law systems there is “a tendency to use abstract terms” and “to employ a conceptual 
approach to legal problems … Legal reasoning in civil law countries is basically deductive”. 
Liechtenstein has a written constitution dating from 1921. The wording of its acts and 
ordinances is based on the abstraction principle.  
 
Unlike many other small states, Liechtenstein has no colonial past. This is also true for 
Andorra, Monaco and San Marino whose origins date back to the middle ages (Marxer & 
Pállinger, 2009, p. 901). However, the Princely House of Liechtenstein stems from Austria. 
Therefore, the microstate adopted important codes of law from the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy in the 19th century. As the two countries formed a customs and currency union from 
1852 to 1919, a large number of Austrian norms were also automatically in force in 
Liechtenstein. After World War I, the principality politically turned to Switzerland. In the 
1920s, property law and labour law were copied from Switzerland, to name the most important 
examples. In 1923, Liechtenstein decided to form a customs union with Switzerland. 
Thereafter, the two states concluded several other agreements (Frommelt, 2016, p. 131). Since 
then, more and more parts of Liechtenstein’s substantive law have been influenced or overlaid 
by Swiss legal provisions. Many Swiss norms automatically apply to Liechtenstein due to the 
customs union. Remarkably, large parts of civil law (Berger, 2011), criminal law and 
procedural law (concerning civil, criminal and administrative cases) are still very similar – 
though not identical – to Austrian law. This difference in the origins of procedural and 
substantive law may also be observed in mixed jurisdictions, i.e. legal systems in which civil 
law and common law meet (Palmer, 2012a, p. 611). However, whereas in Liechtenstein the 
older Austrian law still dominates the procedural law, in many polyjural jurisdictions common 
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law as the younger law “shapes the fields of procedural, constitutional, and commercial law” 
(Andó, 2015, p. 8). 
 
In 1995, Liechtenstein became the smallest member state of the European Economic 
Area (EEA). Particularly because of the customs union with Switzerland and its EEA 
membership, the principality has to adopt a lot of foreign norms and standards (Frommelt, 
2016). The number of new laws passed every year is no smaller than in many larger states. To 
reduce the costs of law-making, it is not uncommon to copy entire laws or large parts of laws 
from Austria or Switzerland. Liechtenstein’s part-time parliament mostly rubber-stamps the 
respective bills. According to Frommelt (2011, p. 27), just a third of all acts adopted in the 
period 2001-2009 had a political origin within the microstate. There are several recent 
examples of extensive “copy and paste legislation”. For example, in 2016 the tenant law was 
completely revised. Liechtenstein switched from an act influenced by Austrian law to a new 
act that literally copied the articles of Swiss tenant law article by article – except for a few 
norms protecting the tenant which the Liechtenstein government and parliament did not accept. 
 
Foreign law of neighbouring countries and European law also play an important role 
for other very small jurisdictions. For example, Monaco’s policies are strongly influenced by 
French law because of numerous bilateral treaties (Marxer & Pállinger, 2009, p. 935). San 
Marino agreed, inter alia, to adapt its tax law to the Italian legislation to some extent (Marxer 
& Pállinger, 2009, p. 945). Certain EU legal provisions indirectly apply to Andorra, Monaco 
and San Marino due to customs, currency and economic agreements with their respective 
neighbouring states. 
 
To sum up, the extensive adoption of foreign legal provisions has a long tradition in 
Liechtenstein. Its current law is significantly shaped by Austrian, Swiss and EU norms. The 
principality’s legal system is quite often labelled as a “Mischrechtsordnung” (translated 
literally: mixed legal order). However, mixed jurisdictions are often defined as English-
speaking legal orders with “parents” in both civil law and common law (Palmer, 2012b, p. 8; 
Siems, 2014, pp. 85-86; for a critique see e.g. Muñiz Argüelles, 2015, p. 34). Therefore, we do 
not call Liechtenstein a mixed jurisdiction. Liechtenstein’s legal system is not a mixture of 
common law and civil law, although the legal entity of trust – foreign to civil law – was 
deliberately incorporated into company law in 1926 (Schurr, 2014, p. 4). Moreover, most legal 
norms that coexist in the principality do not originate from real foreign cultures (see the 
definition of polyjurality by Andó, 2015, p. 4): Apart from EU norms and the legal concept of 
trust, most legal provisions have their origins in the German-speaking neighbourhood. Against 
this background, we prefer to call Liechtenstein a hybrid legal system. In any case, assumption 
1 clearly applies to Liechtenstein. Examples from other European microstates also support the 
presumption that small jurisdictions extensively adopt foreign legal norms. 
 
The Prince and the People: Liechtenstein’s exceptional constitutional characteristics 
 
The current constitution of Liechtenstein, enacted in 1921, is mainly based on some 
more or less modified parts of the principality’s previous constitution, several articles inspired 
by the Austrian constitutional debate at that time and a couple of norms copied from 
constitutions of Swiss cantons. The legal foundations of other very small countries also draw 
on constitutional law from neighbouring states. For example, the constitution of the Principality 
of Andorra particularly adopted the Spanish constitution’s long catalogue of social and cultural 
rights. Remarkably, the constitutions of the European microstates are quite short compared to 
the constitutions of most of their respective neighbouring countries apart from France. 
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Article 2 of the constitution of Liechtenstein (commonly referred to as 
Landesverfassung, hereinafter LV) provides that the “Principality is a constitutional, hereditary 
monarchy on a democratic and parliamentary basis … the power of the State is embodied in 
the Reigning Prince and the People”. The constitutional order of Liechtenstein is often 
described as a dualistic system with two pillars of state power: the Prince and the people 
(Veenendaal, 2015, p. 337; Wille, 2015, p. 728). Thus, Liechtenstein constitutionalism 
particularly combines a powerful monarch (European Commission for Democracy through 
Law, 2002, p. 12) with extensive direct democratic elements. 
 
The Reigning Prince functions as the head of state (Article 7 para 1 LV). He “shall not 
be subject to jurisdiction and shall not be legally responsible” (Article 7 para 2 LV). He is one 
of the richest monarchs in Europe but does not have to pay taxes. The Prince may represent 
Liechtenstein in international relations (Article 8 LV). Article 9 LV stipulates that “every law 
shall require the sanction of the Reigning Prince to attain legal force”. This means that every 
law passed by the Landtag, Liechtenstein’s single-chamber parliament, needs the consent and 
signature of the Prince. The same applies if the people vote on a popular initiative or a 
referendum: the Prince has to assent to every bill adopted by the people. Moreover, the monarch 
has the right to enact emergency decrees (Article 10 para 2 LV). The Prince appoints the 
members of the government (Article 79 para 2 LV). He is also entitled to dismiss the 
government on his own, i.e. without the consent of parliament (Article 80 LV), and to dissolve 
the Landtag (Article 48 para 1 LV). The monarch appoints the judges and dominates the 
respective selection procedure (Articles 11 and 96 LV). He has the right “of pardon, of 
mitigating or commuting legally adjudicated sentences, and of quashing initiated 
investigations” (Article 12 para 1 LV). Finally, the Law on the Princely House of Liechtenstein 
which regulates, inter alia, hereditary succession to the throne, is laid down by the members 
of the Princely House themselves, without the consent of parliament or people (Article 3 LV). 
 
These remarkable constitutional provisions are by no means dead letter or just symbolic 
law. The Prince or the Hereditary Prince occasionally makes use of his extensive rights (Schiess 
Rütimann, 2013; Veenendaal, 2015; Wolf, 2015). Two bodies of the Council of Europe – the 
European Commission for Democracy through Law (2002) and the Group of States against 
Corruption (2011) – have criticized several legal powers of the monarch. The European Court 
of Human Rights (1999) ruled that Prince Hans-Adam II’s decision not to reappoint an 
experienced lawyer to public office because of certain views the latter had expressed in a public 
lecture violated the applicant’s right to freedom of expression. 
 
On the other hand, Liechtenstein has far-reaching and rare instruments of direct 
democracy (Marxer, 2014). In principle, all laws and important financial resolutions passed by 
the Landtag are “subject to a popular vote if Parliament so decides or if at least 1,000 
Liechtenstein citizens eligible to vote or at least three municipalities submit a request to that 
effect” (Article 66 para 1 LV). 1,500 citizens or four municipalities can request a referendum 
on international treaties concluded by Liechtenstein (Article 66bis LV). Moreover, at least 
1,000 Liechtenstein citizens or three municipalities may submit a popular initiative (Article 66 
para 2 LV). A popular initiative concerning the constitution requires supporting signatures of 
at least 1,500 Liechtensteiners or respective decisions of four municipalities (Article 66 para 4 
LV). If the parliament rejects an initiative by the people, the bill automatically is put to a 
popular vote (Article 66 para 6 LV). There are further – more or less hypothetical – 
participatory elements regarding the convention and dissolution of parliament (Article 48 LV), 
the selection of judges (Article 96 para 2 LV), a motion of no-confidence against the Prince 
(Article 13ter LV) and the abolition of the monarchy (Article 113 LV). The fact that the Prince 
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has to assent to every bill adopted by the people – apart from the unlikely abolition of the 
monarchy – means that the monarch’s veto power outweighs the strong direct democratic 
instruments. 
 
Other European microstates also have exceptional constitutional characteristics. For 
example, the Prince of Monaco is at least as powerful as Liechtenstein’s head of state. The 
European Commission for Democracy through Law (2013) described Monaco as a “sui generis 
system of limited monarchy” (p. 19) and complained about the “extensive powers of the 
Prince” (p. 19). It concluded that the Mediterranean principality “is not a parliamentary 
monarchy; it is not a representative system, in which the executive is accountable to the elected 
legislature or the electorate” (p. 19). Another example is Andorra. A condominium in former 
times, modern Andorra still is a unique co-principality, with the bishop of Urgell (in Catalonia) 
and the President of the French Republic as its co-princes, i.e. head of state (Marxer & 
Pállinger, 2009, p. 905). 
 
To sum up, the constitution of Liechtenstein provides for both one of the most powerful 
monarchs worldwide and one of the most extensive direct democratic governmental systems 
on earth (cf. Marxer, 2014, p. 14). This exceptional dualistic constitutionalism is important for 
the microstate’s national identity (Veenendaal, 2015, p. 347). Although day-to-day-politics is 
usually dominated by the government (Wolf, 2015, p. 358), assumption 2 obviously applies to 
Liechtenstein. Examples from other European microstates support the presumption that small 
jurisdictions feature remarkable or unusual constitutional characteristics. 
 
Liechtenstein’s partially deficient legal system 
 
Due largely to its smallness, the Alpine principality’s legal system has some remarkable 
characteristics. Other very small jurisdictions show similar socio-legal features. In this section 
regarding assumption 3, we focus on legal education, the court system as well as legal research 
and scholarship.  
 
Legal education 
 
Liechtenstein has a small public university and a tiny private university, but both do not 
offer basic study programmes in law. This is also true for e.g. the International University of 
Monaco. High school graduates from Liechtenstein have to choose a university abroad to study 
for their Bachelor and Master of Law degrees (Marxer, 2016a). They mostly chose Austrian or 
Swiss universities. There is no noticeable difference between graduates from Austria and 
Switzerland – but usually none of them have been taught Liechtenstein law (Schiess Rütimann, 
2015, pp. 20-21). Lawyers working in the microstate have to learn the special features of 
Liechtenstein law on the job. There are some in-house courses for new public officials. The 
University of Liechtenstein offers several postgraduate professional education programmes in 
law, tailored to the needs of the Liechtenstein financial centre – similar to what Donlan et al. 
(2017, p. 199) describe with regard to Malta. These LL.M., diploma or certificate programmes 
deal with banking and finance law, securities law, trust law and services, intellectual property 
law and/or international taxation. Liechtenstein’s private university offers a six-semester 
doctoral programme in law. However, these doctoral students only occasionally write their 
theses on aspects of Liechtenstein law. 
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In a small jurisdiction, it makes no sense to specialise in a single area. Every lawyer 
should have a basic knowledge of every field of law (Donlan et al., 2017, p. 209). This can also 
be seen in the curricula vitae of candidates proposed by microstates as judges for the European 
Court of Human Rights (for an example regarding San Marino see Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Council of Europe, 2018). Similar to the situation in Liechtenstein, the University of San 
Marino offers a course in trust law and a basic course which introduces lawyers and economists 
to the law of San Marino. The University of Andorra and the Open University of Catalonia 
jointly offer online studies to obtain the bachelor of law degree. Within this collaboration, 
however, the Andorran University is only in charge of teaching the specific subjects of 
Andorran constitutional and civil law.  
 
Court system 
 
For a long time, Liechtenstein’s judicial system was partially outsourced. From 1809 
onwards, only the court of first instance was located in the principality. The Princely Court 
Chancellery in Vienna (Austria) served as second instance. From 1818 on, the Higher Regional 
Court in Innsbruck (Austria) was the third instance. When the 1921 constitution came into 
force, all courts had to be established in Liechtenstein. Apart from that, Article 1 para 2 LV 
stipulates that parliament and government must have their seat in the capital Vaduz. This 
provision makes clear that Liechtenstein from 1921 on has to be ruled by citizens of 
Liechtenstein residing in the principality. In larger states, such an issue is usually not laid down 
in the constitution, of course. Other very small jurisdictions also outsourced their judicial 
systems more or less in former times. In Andorra, for example, legal disputes were settled by 
the judiciaries of the two coprinces in the past (Marxer & Pállinger, 2009, pp. 903-904). 
 
According to Article 97 LV, there are several ordinary courts in Liechtenstein: the 
Princely Court of Justice (first instance), the Princely Court of Appeal (second instance) and 
the Princely Supreme Court (third instance). There is also an Administrative Court (Article 102 
LV) and the Constitutional Court (Article 104 LV). All courts are situated in Vaduz, 
Liechtenstein’s capital. Judges are usually selected by a special committee – chaired by the 
Prince – and elected by parliament (Article 96 LV). The constitution of Liechtenstein provides 
that the majority of the judges of the Administrative Court and the Constitutional Court have 
to be Liechtensteiners (Articles 102 and 105 LV). Traditionally, one judge and one alternate 
judge of the five judges of the Constitutional Court are Austrians whereas one judge and one 
alternate judge are Swiss citizens (Bussjäger, 2016, pp. 18-19). Remarkably, many foreign 
judges of higher instances who are not employed full-time continue to work as attorneys, 
judges, legal consultants or professors in their home country. Apart from the courts, there are 
unusual substitute rules for members of government and parliament in Liechtenstein in order 
to cope with limited human resources (Schiess Rütimann, 2016). 
 
Very small jurisdictions seem to be prone to conflicts of interest (“everyone knows 
everyone”). For example, two judgements of the European Court of Human Rights (2009, 
2015) concerning Liechtenstein and Malta show that small court systems sometimes have 
difficulties assuring the impartiality of the judges involved in a case. Against this background, 
there is a long tradition in Monaco to elect only foreigners residing abroad as judges of the 
Constitutional Court. Likewise, San Marino has a long tradition of recruiting foreign lawyers, 
i.e. Italians, as judges (Marxer & Pállinger, 2009, p. 944). In the past, a constitutional provision 
did not even allow nationals of San Marino to become judges in their country. Apart from that, 
small countries often need foreign judges because of limited human resources and lack of legal 
expertise. For example, currently two out of the four judges of the Constitutional Court of 
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Andorra are Spanish nationals and one is a French national. In San Marino, the current 
president of the Constitutional Court is a national of San Marino while the other two judges 
and three alternate judges are Italian citizens. Currently 42% of all the judges in Liechtenstein 
have an Austrian or Swiss nationality. Similarly, about half of the judges of the Principality of 
Monaco are French nationals (Blevin, 2016, p. 286; European Commission for Democracy 
through Law, 2013, p. 17). 
 
Legal research and scholarship 
 
Less than ten scholars are engaged in conducting research on Liechtenstein law. They 
are often foreigners and either work at the University of Liechtenstein or the Liechtenstein-
Institut, an interdisciplinary, private and non-profit research institute. Most professors of the 
principality’s private university are foreigners and just come to the microstate for their teaching 
sessions. There is a general lack of public funding for independent research in Liechtenstein – 
and not only in the field of law (Marxer, 2016b). In many civil law countries and particularly 
in the Germanic legal family, there is a tradition of lawyers writing detailed commentaries on 
every single article of important acts. Liechtenstein is an exception in this regard due to the 
lack of legal scholars. There is only an online commentary on the constitution (Liechtenstein-
Institut, 2016; Bussjäger, 2018, p. 696). Against this background, court decisions are of great 
importance. However, in many areas there are no judgements. Moreover, many judgements 
cannot be upheld or overruled because there are no similar cases.  
 
Apart from a single law review (“Liechtensteinische Juristen-Zeitung”) and a couple of 
academic books and edited volumes on selected aspects of Liechtenstein law, there is hardly 
any specialised literature such as legal textbooks (Bussjäger, 2018, p. 691). When it comes to 
other small countries, legal practitioners and researchers are confronted with similar problems. 
For example, specialised literature on Monegasque law is very scarce except for a law review 
published in the microstate (“Revue de droit monégasque”). In prestigious journals such as the 
Global Review of Constitutional Law, there is a general lack of information about countries 
like Andorra, Monaco and San Marino. 
 
According to Mousourakis (2015, p. 304), in civil law countries “an ever-vigilant 
academic community observes, reviews and critiques the courts to ensure that any shaping or 
re-shaping of the law remains a controlled activity”. In Liechtenstein, comments on certain 
judgements are sometimes published, but many of them are written by judges. There are not 
enough legal scholars to comment on important judgements on a regular basis. This is also true 
for other very small jurisdictions, for example Monaco (Linotte, 2016, p. 95). Lawyers in 
Liechtenstein usually try to apply legal provisions copied from Austria or Switzerland exactly 
as they are interpreted in the country of origin in order to save time and effort. For these 
purposes, they extensively draw on foreign judgements and academic literature. Copied norms 
revised in their native country may lead to problems (Schiess Rütimann, 2015). Other practical 
difficulties may arise when material law based on Swiss acts must be dealt with before the 
courts by means of procedural law similar to Austrian norms (cf. Palmer, 2012a, pp. 611-612).  
 
To sum up, Liechtenstein’s legal system significantly depends on the law schools of 
foreign universities although for example research on Liechtenstein’s constitutional law has 
significantly developed since the 1980s (Bussjäger, 2018, p. 693). Moreover, the principality’s 
courts permanently need to employ foreign lawyers, particularly from Austria and Switzerland. 
Legal provisions based on acts from other jurisdictions are interpreted with the help of foreign 
court decisions and academic literature. Therefore, we can conclude that assumption 3 also 
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applies to Liechtenstein. Several examples from other European microstates support the 
presumption that small jurisdictions are dependent on external resources to maintain their 
judicial and legal institutions. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This interdisciplinary contribution started from the research question “Are there any 
specific small state characteristics when it comes to the emergence, function and application of 
legal norms?” We deduced the following assumptions from theoretical considerations about a 
small jurisdiction: (1) it is liable to adopt foreign legal norms extensively; (2) it tends to feature 
remarkable or unusual constitutional characteristics; and (3) it is dependent on external 
resources to maintain its judicial and legal institutions. Obviously, we have not deduced all 
possible assumptions concerning small legal systems. Therefore, we encourage other small 
state researchers to formulate further relevant presumptions. 
 
An exploratory single-case study showed that all of our three assumptions apply to 
Liechtenstein. The principality can be described as a hybrid legal system that is significantly 
shaped by Austrian, Swiss and EU norms. Liechtenstein’s dualistic constitution particularly 
combines a powerful monarch with extensive direct democratic elements. Finally, the 
microstate’s legal system depends on external resources such as law schools, foreign legal 
experts and academic sources. Several brief comparisons and examples regarding in particular 
Andorra, Monaco and San Marino tentatively support our assumptions. As a (very) small state, 
Liechtenstein does not seem to be a clear outlier or deviant case that is not at all suited for 
generalisation. Thus, we hope that our theoretical assumptions on the legal systems of small 
jurisdictions, supported by our case study, may contribute to “mainstreaming the study of small 
states” (Baldacchino, 2018). 
 
Despite its peculiarities described in the empirical parts of this paper, Liechtenstein can 
be seen as a “most likely” case when it comes to examine assumptions derived from small state 
theory. The principality “is such a diminutive country that small state characteristics can be 
supposed to have particularly strong effects” (Wolf, 2016b, p. 93). Nevertheless, as we 
conducted an exploratory study, our assumptions just passed a “plausibility probe”, not a 
rigorous analysis (cf. King et al., 1994, p. 209; Welzel, 2016, p. 412). Therefore, we suggest 
an application of the assumptions of this exploratory paper to a wider range of jurisdictions – 
including islands, poor and rather undemocratic countries – in order to learn more about their 
explanatory power. 
 
It is quite possible that larger small states show different or mixed results. As Geser 
(1991, pp. 96-97) rightly pointed out, smallness can be a causal, functional or conditional 
factor. Certain country-specific or regional characteristics may weaken or neutralise the small 
state effects assumed by our presumptions. In any case, law and legal systems seem to be a 
promising field for further interdisciplinary small state research, particularly large-n studies. 
On the other hand, qualitative in-depth analyses like this paper are able to thoroughly study 
socio-legal phenomena in clearly under-researched small jurisdictions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                Law, small state theory and the case of Liechtenstein 
 193
References 
 
Andó, B. (2015). “As slippery as an eel”? Comparative law and polyjural systems. In V. V. 
Palmer, M. Y. Mattar & A. Koppel (Eds.), Mixed legal systems, east and west (pp. 3-15). 
Farnham: Ashgate. 
 
Baldacchino, G. (2018). Mainstreaming the study of small states and territories. Small States 
& Territories, 1(1), 3-16. 
 
Berger, E. (2011). Rezeption im liechtensteinischen Privatrecht unter besonderer 
Berücksichtigung des ABGB. 2nd edn. Berlin: LIT. 
 
Blevin, P.-A. (2016). Les micro-états européens : Étude historique, juridique et fiscale 
(Andorre, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Saint-Marin, Vatican). Paris: L’Harmattan. 
 
Bussjäger, P. (2016). Eigenständige Verfassungsdogmatik am Alpenrhein? Der Einfluss 
österreichischer und schweizerischer Staatsrechtslehre am Beispiel des Staatsgerichtshofes. In 
S. Wolf (Ed.), State size matters: Politik und Recht im Kontext von Kleinstaatlichkeit und 
Monarchie (pp. 15-31). Wiesbaden: Springer. 
 
Bussjäger, P. (2018). Verfassungsrecht im Kleinstaat. Zur Entwicklung der 
Verfassungsrechtsdogmatik in Liechtenstein. Jahrbuch des Öffentlichen Rechts der 
Gegenwart, 66, 683-699. 
 
Butler, P., & Morris, C. (2017.) Preface. In P. Butler & C. Morris (Eds.), Small states in a legal 
world (pp. v-viii). Cham: Springer. 
 
Donlan, S. P., Marrani, D., Twomey, M., & Zammit, D. E. (2017). Legal education and the 
profession in three mixed/micro jurisdictions: Malta, Jersey, and Seychelles. In P. Butler & C. 
Morris (Eds.), Small states in a legal world (pp. 191-212). Cham: Springer.  
 
European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) (2002). Opinion on 
the amendments to the Constitution of Liechtenstein proposed by the Princely House of 
Liechtenstein. Strasbourg, 16 December 2002, CDL-AD (2002) 32. Available at: 
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2002)032-e 
 
European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) (2013). Opinion on 
the balance of powers in the Constitution and the Legislation of the Principality of Monaco. 
Venice, 14-15 June 2013, CDL-AD (2013) 018. Available at: 
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2013)018-e.  
 
European Court of Human Rights (1999, October 28). Case of Wille v. Liechtenstein. 
Application no. 28396/95. Available at: 
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22fulltext%22:[%22wille%20liechtenstein%22],%22docu
mentcollectionid2%22:[%22GRANDCHAMBER%22,%22CHAMBER%22],%22itemid%22
:[%22001-58338%22]}.  
 
European Court of Human Rights (2009, October 15). Case of Micallef v. Malta, Application 
no. 17056/06. Available at: 
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22fulltext%22:[%22Micallef%20v.%20Malta%22],%22do
Sebastian Wolf, Peter Bussjäger & Patricia M. Schiess Rütimann 
 
 194
cumentcollectionid2%22:[%22GRANDCHAMBER%22,%22CHAMBER%22],%22itemid%
22:[%22001-95031%22]}.  
 
European Court of Human Rights (2015, July 9). Case of A. K. v. Liechtenstein. Application 
no. 38191/12. Available at: 
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22tabview%22:[%22document%22],%22itemid%22:[%22
001-155824%22]}.  
 
Frommelt, C. (2011). Die Europäisierung der liechtensteinischen Rechtsordnung. 
Arbeitspapiere Liechtenstein-Institut No. 28. 
 
Frommelt, C. (2016). Liechtenstein’s tailor-made arrangements in the EEA: a small state’s 
creative solutions in European integration. In S. Wolf (Ed.), State size matters: Politik und 
Recht im Kontext von Kleinstaatlichkeit und Monarchie (pp. 131-162). Wiesbaden: Springer. 
 
Gantner, M. & Eibl, J. (1999). Öffentliche Aufgabenerfüllung im Kleinstaat: Das Beispiel 
Fürstentum Liechtenstein. Vaduz: Verlag der Liechtensteinischen Akademischen Gesellschaft. 
 
Geser, H. (1991). Kleine Sozialsysteme – ein soziologisches Erklärungsmodell der 
Konkordanzdemokratie? In H. Michalsky (Ed.), Politischer Wandel in 
konkordanzdemokratischen Systemen (pp. 93-121). Vaduz: Verlag der Liechtensteinischen 
Akademischen Gesellschaft. 
 
Geser, H. (1992). Kleinstaaten im internationalen System. Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und 
Sozialpsychologie, 44(4), 627-654. 
 
Glenn, H. P. (2006). Comparative legal families and comparative legal traditions. In M. 
Reimann & R. Zimmermann (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of comparative law (pp. 421-439). 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Group of States against corruption (2011). Evaluation report on Liechtenstein. Joint First and 
Second evaluation rounds, Eval I/II Rep (2011) 1E. Available at: 
https://www.coe.int/en/web/greco/evaluations/liechtenstein  
 
King, G., Keohane, R. O., & Verba, S. (1994). Designing social inquiry: Scientific inference 
in qualitative research. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Kocher, M. (2002). Very small countries. Economic success against all odds. Schaan: Verlag 
der Liechtensteinischen Akademischen Gesellschaft. 
 
Kramer, E. (2017). Hauptprobleme der Rechtsrezeption. Juristen Zeitung 72(1), 1-11. 
 
Liechtenstein-Institut (2016). Kommentar zur Liechtensteinischen Verfassung. Online-
Kommentar. Bendern: Liechtenstein-Institut. Available at: www.verfassung.li.  
 
Linotte, D., (2016). La portée de l’action médiatique des cours constitutionnelles. Le cas de 
Monaco. In ACCPUF (Association des Cours Constitutionnelles ayant en Partage l'Usage du 
Français) (Ed.), Les cours constitutionnelles et les médias. ACCPUF Bulletin n° 11, November 
2016, 93-96. Available at: https://www.accpuf.org/index.php/publications/61-
publications/341-bulletin-n-11-session-4-monaco.  
                                                                Law, small state theory and the case of Liechtenstein 
 195
 
Marxer, W. (2014). Entwicklung der direkten Demokratie in Liechtenstein. In A. Balthasar, P. 
Bussjäger & K. Poier (Eds.), Herausforderung Demokratie. Themenfelder: Direkte 
Demokratie, e-Democracy und übergeordnetes Recht (pp. 3-14). Wien: Jan Sramek Verlag. 
 
Marxer, W. (2016a). Forschung und Lehre im Kleinstaat – Eine Perspektive. In R. Banzer & 
H. Quaderer (Eds.). Was wäre Bildung? Festschrift für Klaus Näscher (pp. 163-181). Vaduz: 
Universität Liechtenstein. 
 
Marxer, W. (2016b). Forschungsförderung in Liechtenstein. In Liechtenstein-Institut, 
Historischer Verein für das Fürstentum Liechtenstein & Kunstmuseum Liechtenstein (Eds.), 
“Wer Bescheid weiss, ist bescheiden”: Festschrift zum 90. Geburtstag von Georg Malin (pp. 
173-188). Bendern: Verlag der Liechtensteinischen Akademischen Gesellschaft. 
 
Marxer, W., & Pállinger, Z. T. (2009). Die politischen Systeme Andorras, Liechtensteins, 
Monacos, San Marinos und des Vatikan. In W. Ismayr (Ed.), Die politischen Systeme 
Westeuropas. 4th edn. (pp. 901-955). Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. 
 
Mousourakis, G. (2015). Roman Law and the origins of the Civil Law tradition. Cham: 
Springer. 
 
Muñiz Argüelles, L. (2015). Mixed jurisdictions: The roads ahead. In V. V. Palmer, M. Y. 
Mattar & A. Koppel (Eds.), Mixed legal systems, east and west (pp. 33-40). Farnham: Ashgate. 
 
Palmer, V. V. (2012a). Conclusions. In V. V. Palmer (Ed.), Mixed jurisdictions worldwide: 
The third legal family (pp. 611-613). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Palmer, V. V. (2012b). Introduction to the mixed jurisdictions. In V. V. Palmer (Ed.), Mixed 
jurisdictions worldwide: The third legal family (pp. 3-18). Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (2018). Election of Judges to the European 
Court of Human Rights. List and curricula vitae of candidates submitted by the Government of 
San Marino, 23 May 2018, Doc. 14562. 
 
Schiess Rütimann, P. M. (2013). Die politische Verantwortung des Landesfürsten. In H. 
Schumacher & W. Zimmermann (Eds.), 90 Jahre Fürstlicher Oberster Gerichtshof. Festschrift 
für Gert Delle Karth (pp. 829-845). Wien: Jan Sramek Verlag. 
 
Schiess Rütimann, P. M. (2015). Besondere Herausforderungen des Rechts und der 
rechtswissenschaftlichen Forschung im Kleinstaat – am Beispiel Liechtenstein. In Parlament 
der Deutschsprachigen Gemeinschaft Belgiens (Ed.), “Small is beautiful”: Aktuelle 
Entwicklungen in der europäischen Minderheiten-, Kleingliedstaaten- und 
Grenzregionenforschung (pp. 19-37). Eupen: Schriftenreihe der Deutschsprachigen 
Gemeinschaft Belgiens. Available at: 
http://www.pdg.be/PortalData/34/Resources/dokumente/broschueren/Schriftenreihe_PDG_B
and_1.pdf.  
 
Schiess Rütimann, P. M. (2016). Die Regelung der Stellvertretung von Staatsoberhaupt, 
Parlaments- und Regierungsmitgliedern in Liechtenstein – ein anregendes Vorbild? In S. Wolf 
Sebastian Wolf, Peter Bussjäger & Patricia M. Schiess Rütimann 
 
 196
(Ed.), State size matters: Politik und Recht im Kontext von Kleinstaatlichkeit und Monarchie 
(pp. 99-130). Wiesbaden: Springer. 
 
Schurr, F. A. (2014). A comparative introduction to the trust in the Principality of 
Liechtenstein. In F. A. Schurr (Ed.), Trusts in the Principality of Liechtenstein and similar 
jurisdictions: Aspects of wealth protection, beneficiaries’ rights and international law (pp. 3-
38). Zürich & St. Gallen: Dike Verlag. 
 
Siems, M. (2014). Comparative law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Veenendaal, W. P. (2013). Size and personalistic politics: Characteristics of political 
competition in four microstates. The Round Table: Commonwealth Journal of International 
Affairs, 102(3), 245-257. 
 
Veenendaal, W. P. (2015). A big Prince in a tiny realm: smallness, monarchy and political 
legitimacy in the Principality of Liechtenstein. Swiss Political Science Review, 21(2), 333-349. 
 
Veenendaal, W., & Wolf, S. (2016). Concluding remarks: achievements, challenges, and 
opportunities of small state research. In S. Wolf (Ed.), State size matters: Politik und Recht im 
Kontext von Kleinstaatlichkeit und Monarchie (pp. 277-284). Wiesbaden: Springer. 
 
Welzel, C. (2016). Wissenschaftstheoretische und methodische Grundlagen. In H.-J. Lauth & 
C. Wagner (Eds.), Politikwissenschaft. Eine Einführung. 8th edn. (pp. 389-423). Paderborn: 
UTB. 
 
Wettenhall, R. (2018). A journey through small state governance. Small States & Territories, 
1(1), 111-128. 
 
Wille, H. (2015). Die liechtensteinische Staatsordnung: Verfassungsgeschichtliche 
Grundlagen und oberste Organe. Schaan: Verlag der Liechtensteinischen Akademischen 
Gesellschaft. 
 
Wolf, S. (2015). Different approaches, different results in small state studies: complementary 
views on the monarchy and traditional governance in Liechtenstein. Swiss Political Science 
Review, 21(2), 350-361. 
 
Wolf, S. (2016a). Die Erforschung von Politik und Recht in Kleinstaat und Monarchie – Eine 
konzeptionelle Einführung. In S. Wolf (Ed.), State size matters: Politik und Recht im Kontext 
von Kleinstaatlichkeit und Monarchie (pp. 1-12). Wiesbaden: Springer. 
 
Wolf, S. (2016b). Governance in small state legislatures. A theoretical framework and the case 
of Liechtenstein. In S. Wolf (Ed.), State size matters: Politik und Recht im Kontext von 
Kleinstaatlichkeit und Monarchie (pp. 83-97). Wiesbaden: Springer. 
